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out an industrial accident. With all this, the Court relies on cases stating that
physical exertion or climactic incidents (in the nature of fright) are sufficient to
constitute an industrial accident, while saying that they are doing no more
than following precent.
It may well be that the headnote reader may feel assured that his client can
take his ulcer case to the Workmen's Compensation Board, but he had best be
prepared to show that something more than anxiety over business contributed to
its causation.
E.H.
"THiRD-PARTY" ACTIONS LIMITED TO IN-THE-COURsE OF EMPLOYMENT IN-
JURIES-STATE COMPENSATION BOARD'S JURISDICTION OVER INJURIES OC-
CURRING IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE EmPLOYMENT UPHELD
The case of Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co.6 arose from a disputed
workmen's compensation death benefits award. The decedent-employee had
been injured in an in-the-course of employment accident in 1945, which left
him with an ulcer condition. Later, in 1948, the employee was involved in an
automobile collision, and his death from a perforated ulcer followed four months
later. The first defense the self-insured employer posed to the compensation
claim was that the claimants had settled a third-party action without its consent,
contrary to Section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law,7 by their
compromise of a wrongful death action based upon the automobile collision.
Next, the employer objected to the jurisdiction of the Compensation Board to
entertain a claim based upon an accident met with in interstate commerce
employment since the federal remedy for such accidents provided by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act8 was exclusive The Appellate Division
decided in favor of the employer, although expressly only upon the Section 29
ground. 10
The first defense raised a question as to what constitutes a proper third-
party action within the meaning of Section 29. That section merely requires
that the action be one which lies against a party "not in the same employ"
as the "employee" for that party's "wrong or negligence," which has "injured or
killed" the "employee," and for which injury the "employee" is "entitled to
compensation."" This description leaves undertermined whether the wrong
committed by the third party is limited to a wrong causing an in-the-course of
employment injury only, or extends to any wrong causing a subsequent injury
for which the employer is obligated in compensation. In-the-course of employ-
ment wrongs have been the almost singular subject of third-party actions, and
6. 8 N.Y.2d 293, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960).
7. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 29(1).
8. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1958).
9. New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
10. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., 7 A.D.2d 253, 182 N.Y.S.2d 501 (3d
Dep't 1959).
11. Supra note 7.
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some cases appear to view third-party actions exclusively in terms of this
variety of wrongs. 12 However, one subsequent wrong has been held by the
Court of Appeals in the case of Parchefsky v. Kroll Bros. to be a proper third
party wrong.13 In that case the Court held that the malpractice of a physician,
who subsequent to the in-the-course of employment accident negligently treated
the industrial injuries suffered by the employee, was a proper basis for a third-
party action. The statutory description of third-party actions and the subsequent
third-party wrong of malpractice seemingly opened a gap in the law for the
introduction of other subsequent wrongs as third-party wrongs.
In Meackam, the present case, the Court of Appeals returned to the earlier
notion of third-party actions and reasserted the requirement that a third-party
action would lie only for a wrong causing an in-the-course of employment
injury. Thus the employer's Section 29 defense, based upon a subsequent wrong,
was rejected. In reaching its decision, the Court put aside for purposes of
argument the Compensation Board's finding that the subsequent wrong, the
negligence of the driver who injured the employee in the automobile collision,
was not a cause of the employee's death, and, therefore, could not support a
third-party action.
The opinion offers only slight explanation of the Parchefsky case, saying:
"But, Parchefsky simply applies to workmen's compensation law the old rule
that one who wrongfully injures another is liable for the malpractice of the phy-
sician who treats the injury since it is all part of an unbroken sequence."
(Citation omitted.) 14 The dissenting opinion by Judge Froessel, with whom
judge Van Voorhis concurs, is very critical of this distinction. The dissent
points out that other rules such as the "single indivisible result"' 5 and the
"peculiarly susceptible"' 6 condition would apply to the present case with equal
force to connect the in-the-course of employment injury to the ultimate injury
suffered by the employee, his death due to the ulcer condition. Thus the dissent
reads the Parchefsky case as an indistinguishable precedent for classifying the
subsequent wrong in the present case as a proper third-party wrong.
The issue underlying this argument over the precedential value of the
Parchefsky case is whether the claimants, by obtaining both the compensation
death benefits award and the wrongful death settlement, would be allowed a
double recovery. The majority examines the recoveries and finds that only the
"minor item of funeral expenses" is specifically provided for in both the settle-
ment and the award.' 7 The dissent disagrees, stating that the same single injury,
the employee's death, is being redressed under the same theory of damages to
12. Obrien v. Lordi, 246 N.Y. 46, 157 N.E. 925 (1927); Zirpola v. T. & E. Casselamn,
Inc., 237 N.Y. 367, 143 N.E. 308 (1924).
13. 267 N.Y. 410, 196 N.E. 308 (1935).
14. Meachem v. New York Central R. Co., supra note 6 at 298, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
15. Prosser, Torts 226 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Restatement, Torts § 495 (1934).
17. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., supra note 6 at 298, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 574.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
make restitution for the extinguishment of the claimants' means of support. The
majority's next point is that the payments would not constitute an unconscion-
able double recovery in view of the modest total amount that would be received
by the claimants. The majority further observes that there is no positive
prohibition in compensation law against the "collection of additional amounts
from other sources." s18 The dissent, in reply to this, interprets Section 29 as
intending to allow the employer to minimize his compensation burden by placing,
whenever possible, the ultimate responsibility for the damages on the third-
party wrongdoer.
Some criticism of the majority's explanation of the Parcheisky case might
be warranted. If the malpractice rule can be legitimately applied in compen-
sation law, other rules of causality, which Professor Prosser in his discussion of
intervening causes puts on a similar or identical footing with the malpractice
rule,19 can hardly be misapplied to compensation law. The first rule suggested
by the dissent, the doctrine of the "single indivisible result," might be weak in
its application because the rule itself is open to criticism since it obtains due
to a difficulty in apportioning damages rather than resting upon any causal
connection. The second rule, the "peculiarly susceptible" condition suggested
by the dissent, comes very close to the malpractice rule. Both rules concern
subsequent aggravation of the initial injury, which result is occasioned by, or
causally connected to, the initial injury, so that responsibility for the initial
injury carries over to the ultimate injury. Applying these rules to the facts
here, it appears that the risk of the subsequent aggravation of Meachem's ulcer
condition due to a negligent collision is no less forseeable than the subsequent
aggravation of Parchefsky's injured arm due to the negligence of a physician.
At one point the majority does make a reference to the remoteness in time and
space between the industrial accident and the later automobile collision, as if a
ruling on proximate causality were about to follow. However, remoteness in
time and space standing alone would not destroy any proximate causality that
might exist between the industrial injury suffered by Meachem and his eventual
death due to a perforated ulcer. The parallelism of the Parchefsky case and the
present case seems to negative the majority's effort to explain away the
Parchejsky case.
The majority position might, however, be justified on other grounds. The
basis of employer responsibility in general for industrial accidents is contractual,
growing out of the contractual relationship imposed on the employer and
employee by compensation law. The employer's obligation is to pay compen-
sation regardless of his fault in causing the employee's injury, but the employee
in turn takes a lesser satisfaction for that injury. It is not an obligation to pay
compensation because of any fault on the employer's part in causing the
accident. Both the dissenting and majority opinions seem in agreement to this
18. Ibid.
19. Prosser, supra note 1S at 272-273.
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extent. The dissent, however, would connect the employer to both liability and
excuse because the employee's ultimate injury, here his death, can be traced
back to the in-the-course of employment accident for which the employer in the
first instance bears responsibility. The problem is whether Section 29 can be
interpreted to mean any accident caused by another, even where that causality
is at best partial as in the case of subsequent injury. From these premises two
conclusions may be drawn. First, the employer should generally be held liable
for employee injuries, for immediate or in-the-course of employment injuries as
well as ultimate or subsequent injuries, since his contractual obligation is
paramount in compensation law to any excuse ambiguously or inexplicitly
provided in Section 29.20 Second, since the employer is only given an excuse in
view of the culpable nature of third party's act in producing the ultimate injury,
where the third party's act is only a partial cause of the ultimate injury, the
employer's excuse should not be lightly acknowledged. Aside from these
considerations, further arguments can be made for the criterion laid down by
the majority; that is, that only in-the-course of employment wrongs give rise to
third-party actions. This criterion is a much more definite guide by which to
determine third-party actions. Wrong is either committed in the course of
employment or it is not. The criterion suggested by the dissent, that any wrong
which does not break the causal connection between the industrial accident and
the ultimate injury is a third party wrong, would bring with it problems
unsuited to the relaxed forum of the Compensation Board. Altogether these
various considerations would seem to recommend the adoption of an "industrial
wrongs only" criterion for third-party action, producing a result favorable to
both the compensation claimant and to the administration of compensation
claims.
The issue of double recovery is fully discussed by the Court. Again, it
seems that the majority is correct in holding that there is no double recovery
for reasons similar to those supporting the criterion they suggest for third-party
wrongs. The principle that no one shall have a double satisfaction for a single
injury is based upon considerations of justice. Its application in compensation
law is only by analogy, and by virtue of the Section 29 provisions against
complete recovery of both a true third-party settlement or judgment and a
compensation award. In view of the distinct character of the two recoveries, one
obtained in the face of proving fault, and the other without encountering any
difficult problem of proof, it would seem permissible to look beyond the formal
nature of the recoveries to the dollar amounts they represent and consider first
the interests of the injured party before those of the party responsible to make
such satisfaction.
The second defense raised by the employer in the present case, concerning
20. One Minnesota case uses the contractual basis of employer responsibility to reject
malpractice as giving rise to a third party action. McGough v. McCarthy Improvement Co.,
206 Minn. 1, 287 N.W. 857 (1939).
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the compensation board's jurisdiction to entertain a claim founded upon an
interstate commerce employment accident, required the Court to reexamine
Section 113 of the Workmen's Compensation Law.21 Section 113 provides that
the parties to a compensation proceeding may waive their rights to assert a
federally provided remedy, here the FELA. In Ahern v. South Buffalo R.
Co.,2 2 this section of the Compensation Law was tested and found constitution-
ally valid in so far as it was not an encroachment upon the preeminence of the
federal remedy in the field of interstate commerce employment accidents. The
United States Supreme Court approached Section 113 as a mere permissive
provision allowing the parties to a compensation proceeding an additional state
remedy, if those concerned had abandoned by waiver the federally provided
remedy. The precise point at issue upon the facts of the present case is, however,
whether the employer by his conduct in the compensation proceeding could
and did implicitly waive its rights to have the accident claim adjudicated under
the provisions of the FELA. Prior to the Ahern decision the Court of Appeals,
in the case of Fitzgerald v. Harbor Lighterage Co., had purportedly established
a requirement against implied waiver, stating that the compensation parties must
"announce" their intention to abandon their federal remedy.2 3
The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals on this issue was that the
employer had by his conduct implicitly waived its federal rights and remedy as
provided it by the FELA. The following facts were considered as determinative
in the finding of a waiver: ". . . representation of the employer by experienced
counsel; utilization by the parties of the Board's machinery at a series of
hearings resulting in a series of awards; and payment and acceptance of those
awards." 24 (The Court here refers to payments made under a prior award to
Meachem for the ulcer condition originally suffered as a result of the interstate
commerce employment accident.) Thus the employer's second defense was
refused.
In arriving at this conclusion, the majority considered the Ahern case, in
which there were similar facts from which a waiver could be inferred, as' a
relaxation of the earlier "announcement" requirement purportedly set by the
Fitzgerald case. The dissent opposed this interpretation of the Ahern case
stating that the Ahern case rested not upon a finding of implied waiver, but
rather upon a finding of estoppel, since the employer in that case had waited
until the period of limitation governing actions brought under the FELA to run
before it asserted any objection to the Compensation Board's jurisdiction. The
dissent admonishes against allowance of a liberal waiver requirement, because
such a requirement might lead to the inadvertent claimant's loss of the more
lucrative federal remedy available to him. Beyond this the dissent points out,
21. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 113.
22. 344 U.S. 367 (1953), affirming 303 N.Y. 545, 140 N.E.2d 898 (1952).
23. 244 N.Y. 132, 155 N.E. 74 (1926).
24. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., supra note 6 at 300, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
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as the employer had argued, that the case of Baird v. New York Central R.
Co.,)2 5 which held that back shop employees (Baird and Meachem were engaged
to maintain and repair locomotives and other equipment not in use) were
included under the federal remedy, had not been decided at the time the em-
ployer became a party to the present claim.
There does seem to be some lower court authority for holding an implied
waiver under Section 113 of the compensation parties' federal remedy.26
Waiver was implied from the extremely long period of time in which the
employer had made compensation payments. Even in the Fitzgerald case, the
"announcement" doctrine case, Chief Judge Cardozo did not foreclose the
possibility of implied waiver. His words are: "We put aside the question of
whether waiver by the claimant within the meaning of this section is sufficiently
established by the election to file a claim, unaccompanied by express disclaimer
of admiralty remedies." 27 The Akern case may correctly be added to this
list, since as the majority observes:
In Ahern the employer had not raised the question of Federal
jurisdiction until after the workmen's time to bring a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act suit had passed. But there was no intention by
either court [the majority here refers to the fact that both the Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court had rendered decisions
upon the case] that this time element was an essential basis for a valid
finding of waiver by Ahern's employer. Ahern and his employer
waived. Meachem and his employer waived in exactly the same way.
That there was in Ahern's case the added feature of estoppel is a
factual difference, but not such a distinction as to produce a different
result.
28
In effect the majority is admitting the dissent's contention that there was an
estoppel present in the Ahern case, but it also emphasizes the waiver that was
present in that case, since the case seemingly had two grounds for decision. The
majority rebuts the dissent's further point, regarding the state of the law as it
applied to back shop workers at the time the employer became a party to the
present claim, by saying that the employer here was the same party who raised
the jurisdiction question in the Baird case more than three years before raising
it in the present case. In conclusion, it may be said that no insurmountable
obstacle stood in the way of the majority's holding in favor of a liberal waiver
requirement under Section 113. A strict reading of the Akern case would lean
toward the dissent's interpretation of the case on the basis of estoppel. However,
no compelling reason for holding to a strict waiver requirement, in the face of
the more lenient concept of waiver now found in the law generally, can be seen
in the dissent's position. The effect of a liberal waiver provision under Section
25. 299 N.Y. 213, 86 N.E.2d 567 (1949).
26. See Kane v. Morse Dry Dock and Repair Co., 250 App. Div. 888, 7 N.Y.S.2d 465
(3d Dep't 1938).
27. Fitzgerald v. Harbor Lighterage Co., supra note 23 at 136, 155 N.E. at 76.
28. Meachem v. New York Central R.R. Co., supra note 6 at 300, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
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113 is for the time being merely to refuse the right to bring a FELA action to
the more punctilious employer or claimant who by his conduct clearly shows
that he has knowingly given up his federal remedy but who orally insists on
having what advantage it might later present to him. As yet, a liberal waiver
requirement will not refuse the ignorant or unsuspecting their right to bring
an action under the FELA.
D.P.S.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANcE LAW LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO FURTHER LEGIS-
LATIVE INTENT
Four cases decided by the Court of Appeals on the same day present the
judicial interpretation of certain important words in the New York Unemploy-
ment Insurance Law. Section 592, subdivision 1, provides for the suspension of
benefits for a period of seven weeks after loss of employment due to strike,
lockout or other "industrial controversy" in the "establishment" in which
claimant has been employed. Matter of Ferrara"9 held that a controversy caused
by an unauthorized walkout by National Airlines clerks at the Idlewild Airport
office would not preclude payments to National clerks in Manhattan, although
belonging to the same union. Payments were allowed to mechanics and clean-
ers of a different union employed at a hangar 22 miles from the Idlewild office.
Three possible interpretations were presented for the Court's consideration.
The Industrial Commissioner desired a construction of the word "establishment"
broad enough to encompass employees "whose continuance at their jobs has
become useless, or economically wasteful while the strike lasts, and 'because of'
it." National Airlines argued that each metropolitan area constitutes a single
establishment of necessity integrated to sell and provide air transportation.
Claimants sought a narrow construction of the word to make each geographic
location a separate "establishment." It was the claimants' view which prevailed.
The Court reasoned that since the Unemployment Insurance Law was
remedial in nature, to protect workers unemployed through no fault of their
own, it must be given a liberal interpretation. While benefits are suspended to
those directly involved in a strike, to avoid state financing of such strike, this
suspension must be narrowly construed "to effectuate the broad humanitarian
objectives sought to be achieved. . . ." To relate the word to the broad
functions or scattered locations commonplace in our industrial society would
to a great extent defeat the statute's raison d'etre. Also considered was the
legislative resistance to attempts to broaden the meaning of "establishment"
following the Appellate Division decision in Matter of Machincki.30 There, a
strike at Ford Motor Company's Michigan plant did not preclude immediate
benefits to claimants in New York plants laid-off because of it. "Establishment"
was determined from the standpoint of "place where the employee was last
29. 10 N.Y.2d 1, 217 N.YS.2d 11 (1961).
30. 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951).
